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SOVIET START POLICY, 1982-1987
GLOSSARY
ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile
FBS Forward Based Systems
GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
ICBM Intercontinental-range Ballistic Missile
INF Intermediate-randge Nuclear Forces
MIRV Multiple Indepentently Targetable Re-entry
Vehicle
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SICBM Small Intercontintental-range Ballistic Missile
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile
SNDV Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SRAM Short-range Attack Missile (bomber delivered)
SSBN ballistic missile submarine
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems almost certain that the U.S. and Soviet Union
will follow up the December 1987 signing of an INF accord with
the culmination of an agreement on drastically reducing long-
range nuclear forces sometime in 1988. The joint statement
issued at the conclusion of the Washington Summit called for
completing a draft "in time for signature of the treaty during
the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of
1988. h1
Over the past several years, the arms control spotlight
has been alternately dominated by INF and strategic defenses
(SDI and the ABM Treaty) . Very little scholarly attention has
been given to issues of strategic arms reductions. With an
INF agreement signed and on its way to ratification, political
and academic attention should shift to START, where, according
to American and Soviet sources, an agreement between the U.S.
and Soviet Union is imminent.
A START agreement of the kind currently taking shape at
the negotiating table in Geneva poses several challenges to
U.S. defense policy. These challenges must be understood for
adequate choices to be made concerning the future of U.S.
strategic forces policy. A clear presentation of the
evolution of the impending START agreement will constitute a
major part of such an understanding.
"Joint Statement By Reagan, Gorbachev," Washington
Post , 11 Dec. 1987.
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There are at least three major challenges for U.S.
deterrence policy that can profitably be addressed on the
basis of an examination of the evolution of a START agreement
First, it is important to understand how U.S. objectives in
START evolved, and the degree to which they were achieved.
Such an understanding will require a net assessment of U.S.
success or failure in the START negotiations.
Second, it is equally important to understand how Soviet
attitudes and policies towards key START issues evolved over
the 1982-1988 time frame. For example, the Soviets
consistently referred to the START negotiations during the
1982-1983 period as the "negotiations on arms limitation and
reduction," signifying their preference for retaining SALT II-
type limitations rather than effecting deep cuts in offensive
nuclear arsenals.
Soviet START priorities reflected elements of drastic
change, such as the shift in preconditions for a START
agreement demanded by Soviet negotiators — from cancellation
of NATO's INF modernization to unilateral restrictions on the
President's Strategic Defense Initiative. But Soviet START
priorities also showed important elements of constancy —
resisting significant reductions in "heavy" ICBMs, rejecting
direct limitations on ballistic missile throw-weight, and
avoiding disproportionate warhead reductions.
Third, given the present Administration's series of
reports on Soviet noncompliance with major arms agreements,
and the public and media's reactions to these reports, it is
important to examine the question of potential Soviet
noncompliance with a START accord, and U.S. options for
responding to potential Soviet START violations. Given the
radical changes the INF Treaty and impending START agreement
will effect on the American nuclear deterrence posture and
- 5 -
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strategic forces, violations of these agreements will also be
proportionately more significant than violations of previous
agreements. The U.S. must be prepared to deal with the
possibility of Soviet noncompliance with a START agreement.
This research effort will be conducted with a view to address
this critical dimension as well.
This report examines Soviet policy towards strategic arm
reductions from 1982 to 1987, a five year period that
witnessed significant reversals and shifts in Soviet START
policy. An examination of these particular policies will als
provide the most essential insights into the role of arms
control in Soviet strategy and doctrine, as well as the
probability of Soviet compliance with alternative arms contro
regimes in the future. It may also help interpret Soviet
strategic force priorities and concerns.
The United States entered the START negotiations with an
approach based on a clearly defined set of premises, albeit
these premises were the source of considerable contention
within the strategic studies community. The first premise wa
that the United States was in a strategically inferior
position relative to the Soviet Union. Specifically, U.S.
strategic nuclear forces were, or soon would be, vulnerable t
Soviet superiority in powerful, hard-target killing, land-
based ICBM warheads. This superiority was most accurately
reflected, Reagan administration officials believed, in terms
of both the number of warheads on land-based ICBMs as well as
throw-weight, an aggregate measurement of the warheads,
penetration aides, and overall payload a missile could carry.
Throw-weight was considered the best means of comparing the
destructive potential of the two sides' nuclear forces. At
the beginning of START, the Soviet Union had a 3 to 1
superiority in total throw-weight over the United States.
- 6 -
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The Reagan administration also had clear notions of what
had caused this situation. The main cause, in the
administration's view, was SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks, which had been held from 1969 to 1979, and which had
resulted in several agreements and treaties on strategic arms.
Of these agreements, candidate, and later President
Reagan charged that the SALT II Treaty in particular was
"fatally flawed" for the following reasons: (1) it would have
permited substantial growth in both sides' nuclear forces; (2)
it limited launchers, and not warheads or throw-weight; (3) it
sanctioned the Soviets' unilateral right to maintain 3 08
"heavy" ICBMs with no compensating American privilege; (4) it
excluded the Soviet Backfire bomber; (5) its Protocol set an
undesirable precedent for limiting U.S. INF systems (cruise
missiles) without restrictions on comparable Soviet systems;
(6) it lacked sufficiently rigorous verification procedures;
and, (7) it promoted, rather than ameliorated, adverse trends
in the U.S. -Soviet strategic balance. The Reagan
administration was determined to rectify these problems, and
since they had been largely caused by a faulty approach to
arms control, the administration was determined to avoid such
an approach to arms control in the future.
Therefore, the Reagan approach to START sought to avoid
the fatal mistakes of SALT by seeking to reduce (as opposed to
merely limiting) warheads and throw-weight instead of
launchers. This approach was entirely consistent with the
Reagan administration's view of the U.S. -Soviet strategic
balance, what had caused it to shift in favor of the Soviets,
and what it would take to restore it.
The numerous Soviet proposals made since the opening of
START in 1982 provide the principal data for analysis in this
report. Four key issues have been selected for focused
- 7 -
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attention in this report. They are: (1) Soviet policy toward
"deep cuts" in strategic offensive nuclear weapons; (2) throw-
weight limitations; (3) reductions in "heavy" ICBMs; and, (4)
warheads as a unit of limitation. These four issues have beer
chosen from among the many complex issues examined in START
for their direct relevance to Soviet strategic force
posturing.
An important Soviet arms control priority is effecting
reductions or severe limitations in the modernization of U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons. Soviet attitudes towards
reductions in U.S. nuclear forces do not tell us much about
Soviet objectives and priorities relating to their own forces.
Therefore, the four issues selected for attention in this
report mainly represent important U.S. proposals for
reductions in Soviet forces, and reveal Soviet attitudes
towards reductions in their own forces, as well as those of
the United States. Each issue was at one time or another an
important element of U.S. START policy, and consequently
reflected American conceptions of stability and deterrence.
An examination of Soviet responses to these issues will
hopefully provide a valuable contrast to U.S. thinking.
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II. SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, 1982-1987
A. Introduction
The Soviets have made numerous strategic arms reduction
and/or limitation proposals since the beginning of START in
1982. The analysis in this report will be based on the
evolution of Soviet START policy as demonstrated by Soviet
proposals at ten different points in time from 1982 to 1987.
These include:
1. The Initial 1982 Soviet START Proposals
2. The Soviet START Position at the End of 1983
3. The Soviet January 1985 "Umbrella" Talks
Opening Position
4. The September/October 1985 USSR Comprehensive
Proposal
5. The Soviet Position at the 19-21 November 1985
Geneva Summit
6. The 15 January 198 6 "Soviet Program for Total
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons in the World"
7. The 11 June 1986 Gorbachev Proposal For Thirty
Percent Cuts
8. The Soviet Position at the 11-12 October 1986
Reykjavik Summit
9. The Soviet START Position as of May 1987
10. The U.S. and Soviet START Positions at the
December 1987 Washington Summit
- 9
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The following discussion seeks to give a brief overview
of the essential features of these nine Soviet START proposal
or positions during the 1982-1987 period. The purpose is to
show fundamental trends in the Soviet START position as it
evolved over the five year period under discussion.
B. The Initial Soviet START Proposals
The initial Soviet START proposal was enunciated by
Leonid Brezhnev in a speech to an internal audience, the All-
Union Komsomol Congress, on 18 May 1982. While establishing
certain conditions for the success of the talks, Brezhnev's
proposal was very simple, with a high degree of appeal to
popular sentiment. It called for a ban or restriction on "ne
types" of strategic nuclear weapons and proposed a freeze on
strategic nuclear weapons as soon as the talks were to begin
(often referred to in the U.S. as a "negotiator's freeze").
It did not place a high priority on reductions per se, but
sought only to limit or freeze nuclear force modernization to
forces then nearing deployment on both sides. This policy
emphasis is clear evidence that the Soviets were satisfied
with the U.S. -Soviet strategic balance both in terms of
quantity and quality at that time, and with the SALT I and II
agreements which limited, but did not reduce, U.S. and Soviet
strategic arsenals.
2
"Brezhnev: USSR Is Ready for Arms Talks," Current
Digest of the Soviet Press . 34, 20 (16 June 1982): 1-3, 23;
Dusko Doder, "Soviets Call U.S. Plan 'Unfair, Unrealistic',"
Washington Post
. 19 May 1982. An analysis of Brezhnev's
speech can be found in Sallie Wise, "Brezhnev Announces Sovie
Position on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks," Radio Liberty
Research
. RL 206/82, 18 May 1982.
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More detailed elements of their opening position soon
surfaced in the Western media, revealing somewhat more
substance than Brezhnev's Komsomol speech, but emphasizing the
Soviet desire to seek limitations if possible, and modest
reductions if necessary.
Provisions of the Soviets' opening START position
reportedly included the following:
reductions to a common ceiling of 1800 long-range
missiles and bombers by 1990;
a limit of 4 to 6 on the numbers of Typhoon and
Trident class submarines to be permitted (with a
maximum of 16 tubes on each ballistic missile
submarine, or SSBN)
;
a ban or limit on cruise missiles with ranges
greater than 600 km or 3 60 mi;
inclusion of confidence-building measures (such as
advance warning of missile test flights)
;
a freeze on development and deployment of new
systems to run concurrently with the negotiations;
a linkage of progress in START to Intermediate-range
Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations (where the Soviet
7 . . .For accounts of the opening Soviet START positions, see
Charles R. Gellner, U.S. and Soviet Proposals in Negotiations
to Reduce Strategic Armaments (START) — Brief Outlines ,
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1 Jan. 1984;
Leslie H. Gelb, "Offer by Moscow to Curb Bombers and Missiles
Cited," New York Times , 1 Aug. 1982; Michael Getler,
"Officials Cite Options Offered in Missile Talks," Washington
Post , 1 Aug. 1982; and Robert C. Toth, "U.S. Weighs Surprising
Soviet Offer on A-Arms," Los Angeles Times , 13 Sept. 1982. It
should be noted that on 3 Aug. 1982, administration officials
said that public reports of the Soviet's negotiating position
were "fundamentally in error" but did not elaborate, citing
the confidential nature of the talks; see Reuter news bulletin
in Boston Globe . 4 Aug. 1982, as cited in The Arms Control
Reporter . Sept. 1982, p. 611. B. 43.
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position was for complete cancellation of plans to
deploy U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise
missiles)
;
o a twenty-five percent reduction across the board in
the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides;
o retention of SALT II counting rules and precedents
(for example, with regard to cruise missiles and
SALT II provisions for ICBM modernization)
.
o a moratorium on untested strategic nuclear systems;
o an unspecified overall ceiling on the number of
long-range missile and bomber-carried warheads; and,
o verification by National Technical Means (NTM)
.
This proposal was obviously designed to block or
neutralize modernization of key elements of the U.S. nuclear
triad. For example, it would have effected reductions in
overal launchers of nuclear weapons, an area of traditional
U.S. advantage. It also would have blocked the emergence of
an anticipated U.S. lead in advanced, long-range cruise
missiles. It also would have severely limited or banned
future deployments of the U.S. D-5 sea-based ballistic missile
on Trident submarines — an area where the Soviets expected
the largest growth in U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. The
new D-5 missile will reportedly have greater accuracy, range,
and yield — enough to place at risk Soviet hardened targets.
C. The Soviet START Position at the End of 1983
During nearly eighteen months of START negotiations up tc
December 1983, the U.S. position went through several major
modifications, responding first to the April 1983 report of
the Scowcroft Commission recommending deployment of MX and
- 12 -
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development of the Small Intercontinental-range Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) , to the Fall 1983 so-called "build-down"
proposal fashioned by members of the United States Congress,
that called for removing proportionately more warheads from
the stockpile as new ones were added. Of course, there were
also several moves to make the U.S. position more responsive
to Soviet criticisms. That is to say, the U.S. sought to make
its position more negotiable.
The Soviet START position prior to walking out of the
talks at the end of 1983 included only one significant
modification to Moscow's opening proposals. This change
apparently emerged during the Fourth Round of START in the
summer of 1983. It involved the following concessions: 4
o withdrawing the demand that the United States deploy
no more than four to six Trident-equipped
submarines
;
o dropping the proposal that Trident missile loading
be reduced from 24 to 16;
o softening the demand for a total ban on all cruise
missiles with ranges greater than 360 miles, to
allow 12 cruise missile-equipped bombers;
Michael Getler, "Soviets Modify Part of Position on
Missile Cuts," Washington Post , 28 June 1983; William Beecher,
"Soviets Hint at Some Flexibility in Arms Talks, US Officials
Say," Boston Globe , 26 June 1983; and "Arms-Talk Softening
Reported," Associated Press in Denver Post , 26 June 1983. For
details of the Soviet July 1983 proposal, see: Michael Getler,
"Soviets Advance Revised Proposal On Arms Limits," Washington
Post
. 13 July 1983; Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Broadens Arms
Proposals; Hope Seen By U.S.," New York Times , 14 July 1983;
Charles W. Corddry, "Soviet Arms Offer Said to Keep Rockets,"
Baltimore Sun . 14 July 1983; William Beecher, "Arms Talks: A
Hint of Flexibility," Boston Globe . 14 July 1983; and, William
Beecher, "Soviet Hinting Thaw?" Boston Globe , 15 July 1983.
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apparent hints at Soviet willingness to seriously
consider U.S. proposals for confidence-building
measures by agreeing to participate in a special
working group on that subject; and,
a proposal for phased reductions in total Strategic
Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) , MIRVed ballistic




SOVIET PROPOSED START REDUCTION TIMETABLE (July 1983)
1985 1987 1990
SNDV = 2,250 2,000 1,800
MIRVed missiles = 1,320 1,250 1,200
MIRVed ICBMs = 820 750 68
As of the end of 1983 the Soviet position on START
comprised the following elements:
o an interim freeze on strategic nuclear weapons whil<
negotiations were underway;
o an aggregate limit of 1,8 00 on ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers (representing a 20
percent reduction from the SALT II limit of 2,250);
o a sublimit of 1,2 00 on MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
bombers equipped with cruise missiles;
5 National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control:
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o a sublimit of 1,080 on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM
launchers
;
o a sublimit of 680 land-based ICBM launchers;
o unspecified equal limits on missile warheads and
bomber weapons;
o modernization constraints on the size and types of
new SLBM and ICBM missiles, including SALT II-type
limits on MIRV fractionation; and,
o a ban on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles
with ranges greater than 600 km.
It should be noted that this position represents little
change from the opening proposals forwarded by Moscow in the
summer of 1982. Furthermore, this position is not responsive
to U.S. proposals — they did not provide for direct
limitations on warheads (only launchers) , nor did they address
the U.S. call for some form of throw-weight limitation. Also,
the Soviet START position at this point retained the
fundamental structure and counting rules of the SALT II
agreement, with its tiered sublimits on MIRVed SLBM and ICBM
launchers.
D. The Soviet January 1985 "Umbrella" Talks Opening Position
Ending a year-long hiatus in U.S. -Soviet arms
negotiations, the superpowers issued a joint communique on 8
January 1985 agreeing to form a single set of negotiations
with three groups to explore space arms, strategic weapons,
and intermediate range forces, thus the appelation for these
- 15 -
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negotiations — the "umbrella" talks. The communique stated
the following objectives:
The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations wil
be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear
arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all th
questions considered and resolved in their
interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations
will be to work out effective agreements aimed at
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on
earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at
strengthening strategic stability.
Much of the communique appeared to use preferred Soviet
language, thus the phrase "preventing an arms race in space
and terminating in on earth" ~ the slogan of Soviet arms
control policy since early the previous year.
The agreement that outstanding issues would be "resolved
in their interrelationship," while vague and ill-defined, was
clearly an agenda victory for the Soviets. The Soviets had
insisted on linkages among arms control issues since the
beginning of START in June 1982. At that time they had
insisted on linking progress in START to resolution of their
demand that NATO INF modernization be cancelled or reversed.
Now they were linking the resolution of both START and INF to
limits on U.S. strategic defense programs.
Total elimination of nuclear weapons was explicitly
identified by the communique as an objective of the talks:
The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming
negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and
Later the talks would become more commonly known as th
"Nuclear and Space Talks," or NST.
7 New York Times . 9 Jan. 1985.
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reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of
nuclear arms everywhere.
President Reagan had declared early in his administration that
total elimination of nuclear weapons was an ultimate goal, but
it had been interpreted as a general, abstract objective, with
rhetorical value. Such an objective became more explicit when
he launched the Strategic Defense Initiative, whose stated
goal was to render nuclear weapons obsolete — the de facto
equivalent of an arms control agreement banning them.
Of course, total elimination of nuclear weapons had long
been a Soviet goal, beginning with the Molotov proposals in
1945 and extending up through multiple iterations of General
and Complete Disarmament proposals in the 1950s and 1960s.
At the newly commenced "umbrella" talks, the Soviet
opening position set two preconditions for success. First,
the Soviets insisted that no agreement on any one issue would
be signed or completed until the subject of negotiations in
all three forums had been resolved. Second, the Soviets made
restrictions on U.S. SDI in the space group a prerequisite for
agreement in the INF and START groups.
Soviet proposals during the first round of the new
"umbrella" talks had four basic elements. First, the Soviets
revived their "freeze" proposal, calling for a halt to testing
and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons. Second,
8 Ibid .
A thorough review and analysis of Soviet disarmament
proposals is given in P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of
Disarmament
.
(New York: St. Martin's, 1986).
On the Soviet proposal for an INF moratorium, see The
Arms Control Reporter , Section 403, 1 May 1985. On the
Soviets' strategic nuclear weapons freeze proposal, see The
Arms Control Reporter
. Section 611, 28 March 1985.
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the Soviets proposed a one-quarter reduction in strategic
offensive arms "by way of an opening move." 11 Third, the
Soviets wanted a ban on all cruise missiles with a range of
over 600 kilometers. 12 The fourth element of the Soviets'
opening position was the condition that the United States
refrain from initiating an arms race in space.
All these elements were virtual repetitions of Soviet
START proposals from 1982 and 1983. Even the objective of
preventing an arms race in space would have been achieved by
accepting the Soviets' 1982 call for banning new strategic
systems. At this point the reformulated negotiations seemed
to offer nothing in the way of new concessions from the
Soviets, only more explicit calls for restrictions in U.S.
weapons programs.
E. The September/October 1985 USSR Comprehensive Proposal
During the Third Round of the Nuclear and Space Talks
[NST] , the Soviets proposed a series of relatively detailed
reductions and limitations, fleshing out somewhat their
earlier general proposals. 13 Specifically, the Soviets calle
for the following:
11 The Arms Control Reporter . Section 611, 26 April 1985
12 Ibid . . Section 611, 1 May 1985.
13 See Paul H. Nitze, "The Soviet Arms Control
Counterproposal," U.S. Department of State Current Policy , No
758, 24 Oct. 1985.
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o a 50 percent reduction in strategic "nuclear
charges , " apparently including all strategic and
medium-range systems
o a ceiling of 6,000 "nuclear charges"
o no more than 60 percent of "nuclear charges" on any
one leg of each country's triad (thus, ICBM
"charges" would be limited to 3,600)
o a ban on cruise missiles (ALCMs, SLCMs, GLCMs) with
ranges in excess of 600 kilometers
o a ban or severe limit on all "new" nuclear delivery
systems, defined as those not tested as of an agreed
date
o agreement in START and INF to be contingent upon
agreement to ban "space strike arms"
Several dimensions of the Soviet proposal at this point
are worth noting. First, basic elements of the Soviet
position remained unchanged from the 1982-1983 negotiations.
In fact, a Soviet spokesman admitted as much on Moscow
14 Soviet counts gave U.S. 3,360 versus 2,500 for
Soviets, leaving 1,680 for U.S. and 1,250 for Soviets after
applying 50 percent cuts. Since the Soviets were defining
"strategic" to mean weapons that could reach the territory of
the other side, these figures obviously included U.S. systems
in Europe and on aircraft carriers close to the Soviet Union.
See, "The Arms Proposals: A Balance Sheet," New York Times , 13
Nov. 1985.
15 Based on previous Soviet proposals, the U.S.
interpreted this to apply to cruise missiles with ranges
greater than 600 km. See Paul H. Nitze, "The Soviet Arms
Control Counterproposal."
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television 22 October 1985. 16 The Soviets continued to defin
"strategic delivery systems" as those systems that could
1 7
"strike the territory of the other side." A ban on cruise
missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers was retained
as a key element of the Soviet START proposal. The proposed
freeze on the testing and deployment of new nuclear delivery
vehicles was also a holdover from the earlier negotiations, a
was the linkage of a START agreement to resolution of Soviet
concerns lying outside the context of strategic arms
reductions (i.e. U.S. strategic defenses).
Second, the Soviets were pressing a new unit of account
in the negotiations — "nuclear charges." This oblique
reference to warheads was apparently intended to encompass
several types of warheads, including those on cruise missiles
as well as ballistic missiles, and to counter U.S. attempts t
negotiate distinct limits on certain types of warheads.
In effect, the Soviets were proposing a fifty percent
reduction in U.S. long- and medium-range weapons, while on th
Soviet side the fifty percent reduction would apply only to
intercontinental-range weapons. The Soviets counted 3,3 00
'strategic' delivery vehicles on the U.S. side, including
Pershing II, GLCM, nuclear-capable aircraft, bomber carried
short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) , as well as so-called
"central SNDVs" or those based in the homelands of the two
-I c
At a televised press conference, Deputy Foreign
Minister Korniyenko stated: "In the part concerning strategic
and medium-range weapons, [the Soviet Union] has only repeate
the positions it set forth at previous talks, which were
wrecked by the United States." This was an obvious reference
to the earlier START negotiations. See FBIS, Daily Report:
Soviet Union . 23 Oct. 1985.
1 Paul H. Nitze, "The Soviet Arms Control Counter-
proposal. "
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sides. A fifty percent reduction in this number would have
left the United States with 1,650 vehicles for delivery of
long- and medium-range weapons.
The Soviets may have anticipated that the United States
would devote the bulk of this allowance to strategic weapons,
leaving few if any weapons based in Europe. At least, such an
outcome would have been consonant with the primary Soviet
objectives in arms negotiations with the U.S. — namely,
keeping U.S. nuclear weapons out of Europe. The Soviets did
in fact propose a forty percent reduction in long-range
weapons specifically. This implicitly acknowledged that the
overall fifty percent cuts may not have been equally composed
of strategic and theater systems. The remaining ten percent
reductions supposedly would have been made up by cuts in
intermediate-range weapons. In connection with this aspect
of their proposal, the Soviets insisted that the U.S. must
pull out all Pershing II' s unless they were to count against
the 6,000 strategic warhead ceiling.
For themselves, the Soviets counted 2,504 "strategic"
weapons, defined as those that could reach the territory of
the United States. 19 A fifty percent reduction in this number
would have permitted them 1,252 delivery vehicles. The
magnanimous appearance of this proposal is belied by the fact
that it does not at all restrict Soviet deployments of
intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
The Soviet proposed ban on deployments of new strategic
weapon systems would have precluded deployment of the U.S. MX,
18 Boston Globe , 29 Sept. 1985.
1 Q Note that this number exceeds the SALT II Protocol
limit of 2,250 the Soviets and the U.S. were supposed to have
reduced to by 1 Jan. 1983.
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Small ICBM, and D-5 missiles (which had not then been tested)
while permitting the deployment of Soviet SS-24 and SS-25
missiles (which had been tested)
.
With this proposal, Moscow introduced explicit general
limits on warheads, calling for a fifty percent reduction in
"nuclear charges" to 6,000 on each side, claiming the U.S. ha
12,000 accountable warheads. This provision would not have
set specific warhead limits for any particular type of
strategic launcher, thus permitting the Soviets to deploy as
many of them on land-based ICBMs -- a move the U.S. would hav
considered highly destabilizing as it would have preserved th
very disarming first strike capability the U.S. was trying to
negotiate reductions in.
The proposed ban on cruise missiles with ranges greater
than 600 km would leave most Soviet cruise missiles untouched
since nearly all deployed Soviet cruise missiles at that time
fell short of this range limit.
Several points concerning the Soviet position as
presented in the 30 September 1985 proposal should be noted.
First, while this proposal incorporates the spirit of the U.S
'build-down' proposal of Fall 1983, (i.e. warheads as the uni
of limitation) it did not distinguish between bomber and
missile warheads, or between SS-18 warheads and PII warheads.
Second, the 6,000 warhead ceiling could be reached by the USS
without reducing any of what the U.S. considered the most
destabilizing warheads — those on the SS-18 ICBM (numbering
approximately 3,000).
The Soviets may have had difficulty controlling the
accuracy of cruise missiles beyond 600 kilometers, thus
accounting for their failure to deploy longer range weapons o
this type earlier.
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Third, the Soviet offer did not reduce the ratio of
warheads to launchers (some interpretations of how it might be
implemented would even exacerbate this ratio) and therefore
did nothing to contribute to relieving a principal source of
instability in the U.S. view — the number of targets versus
the number of warheads aimed at those targets. x
Fourth, this proposal indicated that the Soviets may have
feared the expense of a potential arms race in strategic
defense systems more than they feared any potential
military/strategic threat posed by offensive strategic or
intermediate range systems.
Finally, as were Soviet START and INF proposals, these
proposals were obviously aimed at ensuring the preservation of
overwhelming Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe by counting
U.S. systems not necessarily deployed on the European
continent, such as aircraft based on U.S. aircraft carriers.
F. The Soviet Position at the 19-21 November 1985 Geneva
Summit
Prior to the Geneva Summit, the Soviets made a number of
overtures regarding strategic nuclear weapons reductions in an
apparent attempt to appear flexible going into the summit
meetings and to place the ball in Reagan's court. In early
October comments by an unnamed "senior Soviet bloc diplomat"
explicitly linked MX to the SS-24, the Small ICBM to the SS-
25, and the Stealth bomber to an advanced Soviet bomber. It
was later suggested that the Soviet Union might be willing to
This was the pervading logic of the Scowcroft
Commission of 1983.
22 See William Beecher, Boston Globe , 10 Oct. 1985.
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trade these systems off against each other, an unusual offer
to give up deployed Soviet systems for non-deployed American
23weapons.
"
The Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Geneva on 19-21
November 1985 yielded no substantive outcome in terms of
nuclear arms control agreements. U.S. and Soviet leaders
signed agreements relating to academic, cultural, and
performing arts exchanges; the opening of new consulates in
Kiev and New York; improving communications and cooperation t
avoid commercial airline accidents in the North Pacific area;
and, the holding of regular high-level meetings to discuss
political issues.
The Soviets reportedly restated their basic positions on
reductions of strategic weapons, and again demanded
restrictions on U.S. strategic defenses as the price for thei
agreement to other arms control issues. On the topic of
strategic arms reductions, the joint statement issued at the
end of the summit meetings stated:
Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. an
the Soviet Union, [the President and the General
Secretary] called for early progress, in particular in
areas where there is common ground, including the
principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms o
23 See William Beecher, Boston Globe , 14 Nov. 1985.
Later this same diplomat said that civilian and military
policy-makers who had opposed the fifty percent cuts proposal
had been removed from their posts in the Soviet Union to clea
the way for U.S. -Soviet agreement on that issue, and that the
U.S.S.R. had never made so radical a proposal.
24 See nText of Joint U.S. -Soviet Statement," Washington
Post . 22 Nov. 1985; and, "A Summary of the Geneva Talks," New
York Times . 22 Nov. 1985.
Roland Powell, "Reagan Reports Some Progress Achieved
on Nuclear Arms Cuts," Monterey Herald . 22 Nov. 1985.
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the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. appropriately applied, as well
as the idea of an interim I.N.F. agreement. 26
G. The 15 January 1986 "Soviet Program for Total Abolition of
Nuclear Weapons in the World"
On 15 January 1986 Soviet General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev proposed a "Soviet Program for Total Abolition of
Nuclear Weapons in the World." According to excerpts
printed in the New York Times it encompassed a three stage
reduction plan, stage one to last from 198 6 to 1990, stage two
1990 to 1995, and stage three the years 1995 to 2000. 28
Stage one would involve a 50 percent reduction in Soviet
and American nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's
territory, a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on these arms; a mutual
pledge by the Soviet Union and the United States not to
develop, test, or deploy "strike weapons" in space; complete
elimination by the Soviet Union and the United States of their
ballistic and medium-range cruise missiles in Europe, combined
with a pledge by the United States not to supply strategic or
medium-range missiles to other countries and a pledge by
Britain and France not to build up their respective nuclear
26 The Arms Control Reporter . 1985, p. 611. B. 276.
27 See "Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev," published by
Novosti Press Agency, 1986, reprinted in The Arms Control
Reporter , 1986,
, pp. 611. D. 53-59; Serge Schmemann,
"Gorbachev Offers to Scrap A-Arms by the Year 2000," New York
Times . 16 Jan. 1986; Don Oberdorfer, "Moscow Proposes A
Timetable for Nuclear Arms Ban," Washington Post . 16 Jan.
1986; and, "Excerpts From the Soviet Leader's Statement on
Arms Control Proposals," New York Times . 17 Jan. 1986.
28 See "Soviet Program for Total Abolition of Nuclear
Weapons in the World," New York Times . 21 March 1986.
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forces; and, a Soviet-American ban on all nuclear explosions
combined with a joint call to other states to join that
moratorium.
In the Second Stage (1990-1995) a freeze on tactical
nuclear weapons would be initiated and joined by other
countries, all nuclear powers would then scrap their tactica]
nuclear forces, join in a ban on space weapons, cease all
nuclear testing, and agree to ban non-nuclear weapons based c
new physical principles;
All remaining nuclear weapons would be scrapped in the
Third Stage (1995-2000) , and the Soviet Union would then agr«
to any verification procedures desired by the West.
The U.S. dismissed these proposals as so much propaganda
and, indeed, the context of their presentation lended
credibility to this charge. Many aspects of this offer woulc
however, be incorporated in later Soviet START proposals.
H. The 11 June 1986 Gorbachev Proposal for Thirty Percent Cut
A proposal reportedly calling for a more moderate
reduction was made by Soviet negotiator Karpov at a plenary
meeting in Geneva on 11 June 1986. While no percentages
were specified, U.S. analysts determined the new proposal
would amount to a thirty percent reduction. In specific
-a n
terms, Karpov offered the following:
"Bargaining Over Arms: How Kremlin and White House
Proposals Compare," New York Times . 3 July 1986.
10 William Beecher, "Soviets Unveil Proposal on Arms; US
Hopeful," Boston Globe . 12 June 1986.
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o raising the proposed limit on "nuclear charges" to
8,000 (from 6,000), with no more than 60 percent
deployed on any one leg of the triad;
o limit SNDVs to 1600
o permitting SLCMs on submarines, but counting them
toward the total SNDV ceiling;
o banning SLCMs on surface ships;
o dropping the inclusion of so-called U.S. forward-
based systems (FBS) from the SNDV ceiling
o a U.S. freeze on medium-range weapons in Europe (and
on aircraft carriers near the Soviet Union)
o banning new types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers
The Soviet proposal included other INF and space arms
provisions and would have had the effect of limiting ICBM
warheads to 4,800 for each side (60 percent).
I. The Soviet Position at the 11-12 October 1986 Reykjavik
Summit
At the October 1986 summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland,
the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to cut nuclear warheads on
ballistic missiles and ALCMs to a common ceiling of 6,000.
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Missiles and bombers were to be reduced to a total of 1,600.
The two sides agreed to postpone limits on SLCMs. J-
Additionally, there were some important areas of
disagreement. The U.S. expressed a desire to eliminate all
ballistic missiles after ten years, while the Soviet Union
proposed to eliminate all strategic offensive weapons after 1
years, and again linked such reductions to restrictions on th
U.S. SDI program. 32 The Soviets apparently introduced the SD
linkage late in the talks when it appeared that the U.S. was
on the verge of accepting the Soviet proposal for a total
elimination of nuclear weapons.
J. The Soviet START Position as of May 1987
In the early summer of 1987, the momentum of progress
seemed to favor an INF agreement before resolution of either
START or space arms issues, a priority that had been agreed
31 •See, inter alia, Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan-Gorbachev
Talks End in Stalemate as U.S. Rejects Demand to Curb 'Star
Wars'," New York Times , 13 Oct. 1986; Leslie H. Gelb,
"Sticking Points in Iceland," New York Times , 13 Oct. 1986;
Frederick Kempe and John Walcott, "Impasse in Iceland," Wall
Street Journal . 31 Oct. 1986; President Reagan, "The
Significance of Reykjavik," U.S. Department of State Current
Policy , No. 880, 14 Oct. 1986; Don Oberdorfer, "At Reykjavik
Soviets Were Prepared and U.S. Improvised," Washington Post
,
16 Feb. 1987; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, The Reykjavik Talks: Promise or Peril , Repor -
of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security
and Science, Jan. 1987, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987);
and, The Arms Control Reporter . 1987, p. 611. A. 4-5.
3 ? Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan-Gorbachev Talks End in
Stalemate as U.S. Rejects Demand to Curb 'Star Wars,' New Yor]
Times . 13 Oct. 1986; and, Leslie H. Gelb, "Sticking Points in
Iceland," New York Times . 13 Oct. 1986.
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upon at the November 1985 Geneva Summit. The Soviets seemed
willing to reach a separate agreement on INF. However, a
picture of the Soviet position on START as of May 1987 can be
pieced together. It had the following provisions:
— 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms by
the end of 1991
— total elimination of strategic offensive arms by the
end of 1996
no START agreement without a space weapons agreement
first33
1,600 ceiling on SNDVs (SLBMs, ICBMs, bombers) 34
6,000 warhead ceiling, to include ICBM, SLBM
warheads, long-range ALCMs, and heavy bombers with
SRAMs and gravity bombs (each bomber to count as one
warhead) 35
50 percent across the board reductions to apply to
heavy ICBMs 3 , earlier proposals called for
sublimits of 80-85 percent of warheads on ballistic
missiles and 60 percent of warheads on any one leg
of the triad 37 (would yield 1540 SS-18 warheads,
SS-18 only existing heavy ICBM) [U.S. proposed
sublimit of 1650 on heavy ICBMs]
SLCM limitations postponed to special negotiations
1987.











37 Ibid . 30 Sept. 1985
38 Ibid . 11-12 Oct. 1986, and 5 April 1987
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U.S. FBS not counted 39
Soviets would permit modernization, U.S. would ban
modernization of heavy ICBMs
— Mobile missiles were to be permitted, although the
U.S. called for banning them.
Some sources in the United States anticipated that the 5'
percent reduction in strategic offensive arms would result in
50 percent reduction in Soviet throw-weight. The U.S. START
position at that time called for a 50 percent reduction from
the current Soviet level. At this point, the Soviets
continued to reject specific direct limits on throw-weight.
There seemed to be some U.S. and Soviet convergence on
three dimensions of a START agreement as of this time. First
that reductions would be fifty percent over a five year
period. Second, there would be a ceiling of 6,000 warheads
permitted both sides, and this ceiling would exclude tactical
or theater nuclear warheads (to be treated separately)
.








, 11 Oct. 1986
Ibid
.
, 8 April 1987
Ibid .
Thomas Netter in New York Times , 13 Nov. 198 6;
Associated Press in Boston Globe , 13 Nov. 1986.
- 30 -
SOVIET START POLICY, 1982-1987
K. Basic Features of the U.S. and Soviet START
Positions at the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit
in Washington December 1987
Basic issues involved in the START negotiations by the
time of the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Washington in early
December 1987 included verification provisions, limits on
strategic nuclear modernization, linkage of a START agreement
to strategic defenses and observance of the ABM Treaty,
warhead sublimits, cruise missile range and total warhead
limits, how to define counting rules for MIRVed missiles and
bombers, and mechanisms for compliance consultation once a
treaty had been signed.
As reflected in the Joint Statement issued at the
conclusion of the Washington summit, the two sides had reached
agreement on many features of a draft START agreement that
would implement the principle of 50 percent reductions, and
that would be ready in time for the two leaders to sign it at
their next summit set for "the first half of 1988" in Moscow.
Other specific provisions included:
o a ceiling of 1,600 on SNDVs
o a ceiling of 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads (on
ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers)
;
o a sublimit of 1,540 warheads on no more than 154
heavy ICBMs (SS-18s)
;
o agreement on counting rules for heavy bombers (i.e.
bombers with SRAMs and gravity bombs, but no cruise
43
"Joint Statement By Reagan, Gorbachev," Washington
Post . 11 Dec. 1987.
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missiles, would count as one warhead regardless of
the number of nuclear explosives they carried)
;
indirect reductions in ballistic missile throw-
weight to 50 percent of the existing level; and,
non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an as yet
unspecified period of time (7 to 10 years.
In addition, the two sides agreed that:
Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begir
not later than three years before the end of the
specified period, after which, in the event the sides
have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to
decide its course of action. Such an agreement must ha\
the same legal status as the treaty on strategic
offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar,
legally binding agreements. 44
Verification procedures were to be based on the framework
adopted in the INF Treaty, calling for a series of inspectior
over a 10 to 13 year period to verify destruction of
proscribed weapons and to monitor known production facilities
Many of these provisions appeared to represent a
resounding success for U.S. START policy. In particular, the
Soviets had agreed to reductions in heavy missiles and their
warheads. However, this probably reflects a Soviet assessmer
that fixed silo-based missiles were becoming increasingly
vulnerable to preemption by new generation U.S. MX and Trider
missiles, and that more of its warhead inventory should be
shifted to mobile basing modes. Banning mobile missile basir
was an issue conspicuously absent from the joint statement.
There were other areas of apparent disagreement. The
U.S. did not secure direct and specific limits on throw-
44 Ibid.
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weight. The joint statement does not make clear which
"existing level" is to be the benchmark for the 50 percent
reductions — the U.S. (1.8 mkg) or the Soviet level (5.6
mkg) ?
Another issue that did not appear in the text of the
joint statement regards sublimits for intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The U.S. wanted two warhead sublimits,
4 5
one for ICBMs and SLBMs combined, and one for reducing ICBM
warheads in particular to 3,300. The Soviets apparently were
resisting both of these categories of sublimitation, and the
United States was reportedly prepared to drop its demand for
the ICBM sublimit in return for other Soviet concessions. 6
4 R . ....The U.S. proposed a ceiling of 4,800 ballistic missile
warheads, while the Soviets countered with an offer of 5,100.
See Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Details Objectives For Summit,"
Washington Post , 6 Dec. 1987. Later reports seem to indicate
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III. SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
ARMS REDUCTIONS, 1982-1983
A. Introductory Remarks
The main Soviet objective in START, as it was in Soviet
foreign policy in general, was to perpetuate the existing
strategic balance between U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. Th
Soviets insisted that this balance was characterized by
parity. To maintain that parity, the Soviets frequently
invoked the principle of "eguality and equal security" as the
preferred (indeed, only) basis for an agreement. In effect
the Soviets used this principle to mean that they should have
the right to military forces egual to all potential enemies
combined. In practice that meant including French and Britis
(and sometimes Chinese) nuclear forces in the U.S. totals. °
Additionally, the Soviet Union sought in START to exploi
and maximize U«S. domestic pressures to restrict the growth
and realization of President Reagan's strategic modernization
program. The Soviets did this by promoting an arms control
process that fulfilled Soviet arms control objectives without
For two Soviet commentaries on the meaning of
"equality and equal security" see V. E. Petrovskiy, "The
Strategic Balance Is an Essential Condition for a Secure
World," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideolocriya , No. 7 (July
1985): 39-50; and, V. K. Sobakin, Ravnaya Bezopasnots'
:
Printsip Ravenstva I Odinakovoy Bezopasnosti V Sovremennykh
Mezhdunarodnyk Otnosheniyakh [Equal Security: The Principle c
Equality and Equal Security in Contemporary International
Relations], Moscow, 1984.
See Nathaniel Davis, "'Equality and Equal Security 7 i
Soviet Foreign Policy," Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy , No.
5, Claremont, CA: Keck Center for International Strategic
Studies, Fall 1985.
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necessitating an agreement on deep reductions in strategic
arms. The Soviets made every effort to focus this process and
U.S. weapons systems in two respects. First, the Soviets
warned that U.S. weapons systems then being developed would
wreck the chances for arms control should they be deployed.
Second, the Soviets sought to portray U.S. weapons as the
principal source of instability in the international system.
Soviet weapons were invariably portrayed as defensive measures
reluctantly undertaken as responses to aggressive U.S.
"warmongering." All this played on the expectations Americans
placed in the START negotiating process.
Soviet START proposals during this time appear to have
had a large propaganda content. This is evidenced by: (1)
Soviet emphasis on a nuclear weapons freeze as opposed to
substantive reductions; (2) the onslaught of Soviet criticism
of the U.S. administration's negotiating position; (3) the
lack of movement in Moscow's START position over the course of
the negotiations; (4) the frequent appeals to European
audiences and other Western audiences; and, (5) the public
nature of Soviet accusations against the U.S. negotiating team
and its positions.
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko gave a speech
to the Supreme Soviet on 16 June 1983. Among other things he
noted that the Soviet Union was determined to proceed "on the
basis of the existing parity, along the road of arms
limitation and reduction so that at any given moment the
balance is preserved but on an increasingly lower level." 49
In this speech, Gromyko stressed that U.S. -Soviet agreements
"must be based on the principle of equality and equal
49
"Excerpts From Gromyko Speech Reviewing Soviet Union's
Foreign Policy," New York Times . 17 June 1983.
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security," making it clear that the Soviet Union perceived th
strategic balance differently than did the U.S. The
following paragraphs will show how the Soviets rebuffed U.S.
attempts to use START to establish a more stable strategic
relationship than had been formed by SALT I and II.
50 Ibid,
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B. Soviet Policy Towards "Deep Cuts"
There were five important dimensions to Soviet policy
towards substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in
the 1982-1983 period. First, Soviet criticisms of U.S. "deep
cut" proposals were reflective of the low priority Moscow
attributed to actually reducing weapons. U.S. proposals for
such were vehemently criticized and dismissed as "deception"
and "propaganda." Second, rather than stressing reductions,
Soviet rhetoric seemed to place the highest priority on
freezing the development and deployment of new strategic
weapons. Third, the Soviets explicitly made American
cancellation of its planned NATO INF deployments a virtual
precondition for negotiations or agreements on strategic arms
reductions. Fourth, when pressed to elaborate on its START
proposals, Moscow made it clear that it defined "strategic"
weapons as those that could reach the territory of the other
side, regardless of their range or mode of deployment. This
was a Soviet definition used in both the SALT I and SALT II
negotiations, and was intended to include NATO nuclear weapons
in the U.S. total, while excluding Soviet short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Fifth, Soviet
reactions to U.S. proposals for strategic arms cuts were
affected by a marked preference for retaining SALT II counting
rules. These five aspects of Soviet policies toward START are
developed in the paragraphs below.
1. Soviet Criticisms of U.S. "Deep Cuts" Proposals
The Soviet Union adamantly rejected "deep cuts" in
offensive nuclear firepower as proposed by President Reagan,
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and heavily criticized the American position on this matter.
The principal Soviet criticism regarding the substance of
President Reagan's Eureka College proposals was that they
were, in Brezhnev's phrase, "absolutely unilateral in
nature." Other Soviet officials were quoted as calling the
sp • ...proposals "unfair and unrealistic." Soviet criticisms of
the U.S. START proposals revolved around the following points
(1) they would require greater reductions in Soviet
land-based missiles than in American land-based
missiles;
(2) they would involve 'troublesome' verification
problems;
(3) the U.S. was using START to compensate for faulty
American force decisions of the 1960s;
(4) implementation of the U.S. START proposals would
upset the then-existing strategic balance;
(5) U.S. START proposals excluded limits on strategic
nuclear systems the U.S. was then developing; and,
(6) Reagan's START proposals were largely propaganda,
motivated by the need to mollify the antinuclear
peace movement both in Europe and the U.S.
51
May 1982
See "Brezhnev's Nuclear Response," Baltimore Sun , 19
52 Dusko Doder, "Soviets Call U.S. Plan 'Unfair,
Unrealistic'," Washington Post , 18 May 1982.
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On the first point, the U.S. had been trying since SALT I
• sito "move the Russians out to sea." This meant urging the
Soviets to shift a larger proportion of their warheads to
submarine-launched ballistic missiles on the grounds that a
sea-based force was more survivable, and hence more
stabilizing since it could not be destroyed in a suprise
attack.
The second point regarding "troublesome" verification
problems is curious, since it was most often the Americans who
complained about verifiability . It can only be concluded that
the Soviets were picking up this objection to Reagan's START
proposals from U.S. critics who had asserted that verification
difficulties would impede the effectiveness of the kinds of
reductions in destabilizing systems Reagan had envisioned.
The third point, that the U.S. was using START to
compensate for faulty nuclear force decisions of the 1960s,
warrants clarification. According to Soviet arguments cited
in the U.S. press, Americans were "trying to change the rules
of the game to correct a decision made two decades ago: to opt
for the smaller but accurate Minuteman apparently on the
assumption that the Soviets would not be capable of improving
their huge SS-11 rocket." 54
The fourth point, that U.S. nuclear weapon modernization
plans would upset the existing strategic balance, was to be a
consistent Soviet theme throughout START. It is especially
interesting because this was also a key Soviet criticism of
CO
The phrase quoted is from Strobe Talbott, Endgame; The
Inside Story of SALT II . (New York: Harper & Row, 1979)
, pp.
163, 207-208. See also John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of
SALT , (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 177-
78.
54 Doder, "Soviets Call U.S. Plan 'Unfair, Unrealistic'.
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NATO's Intermediate-range Nuclear Force modernization efforts
in the INF negotiations, and it would later form the basis of
much Soviet criticism of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) . This theme in Soviet commentaries on INF, START, and
SDI suggests two points. One, the Soviets were satisfied with
the status of the strategic "equilibrium" (to use the common
Soviet term) as it was perceived by them prior to the
beginning of NATO INF deployments in the fall of 1983. Two,
the Soviets perceived NATO's INF deployments as upsetting that
"equilibrium" despite the modest (almost token) number of
weapons to be deployed by NATO (571 warheads on U.S. Pershing
II and cruise missiles compared to over 1,200 on Soviet SS-
2 0s) and the fact that they were to be deployed over a five
year period (maximizing the opportunity for Soviet political
interference in their deployment)
.
The balance of strategic nuclear power in place at the
beginning of START was, in part, the product of the SALT
process. This partially explains Soviet interests in
retaining basic elements of the SALT framework, with its
emphasis on launchers as the principal unit of limitation
(instead of warheads or throw-weight) , its high ceilings on
MIRVed systems, and its failure to restrict Soviet "heavy"
ICBMSc
In connection with the criticism that implementing U.S.
START proposals would upset the existing strategic balance,
the Soviets also charged that these proposals did not meet the
requirement of "equality and equal security. "-'*' One Soviet
commentator expanded on this theme:
So far, neither the president nor his close advisers
have been able to come up with valid arguments and facts
55 Ibid.
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confirming that parity in strategic forces does not exist
and that the balance is in favor of the Soviet Union.
Of course, if one weapons system of the strategic
triad is singled out, one can find disparity. But there
is ample and effective compensation for such disparity in
the triad's other components. 6
The fifth element of Soviet criticisms of Reagan's Eureka
START proposals was Brezhnev's claim that they intentionally
excluded "those types of strategic weapons that [the U.S.] at
present is developing most intensively." Brezhnev was
specifically referring to submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and strategic bombers. Attention might be called
to two implications of this particular criticism. First, it
is profoundly typical of Soviet negotiating practice to
exclude or minimize limitations on systems the Soviets are
currently developing, especially when those systems are
designed to play key roles in the accomplishment of Soviet
war-fighting objectives. Second, the Soviets may in fact be
revealing genuine concern with certain U.S. systems they
consider particularly "de-stabilizing" from their point of
view.
On the sixth aspect of Soviet criticisms, Novosti
commentator Gennady Gerasimov referred to the alleged
propaganda intent of Reagan's Eureka START proposals when he
said: "What also makes one wary is the opinion voiced by
political analysts to the effect that underlying the
president's need for an impressive speech were tactical
motives of current policy rather than principles of peace
considerations." He also noted that President Reagan planned
Vladimir Alexeev of the Novosti Press Agency Moscow in
a letter to New York Times , 24 May 1982.
R7 . ...See Wise, "Brezhnev Announces Soviet Position," p. 2.
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a visit to Europe soon after his Eureka speech, implying that
Europeans may have been as much the intended audience for
Reagan's proposals as the Soviets.
There was also a charge of U.S. disingenuousness. In a
major a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 16 June 1983, Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko stressed the following
theme
:
While the United States' current approach to the
Geneva negotiations has the appearance of flexibility,
this is purely for show, and is intended "to lull . . .
to deceive public opinion, [and] to neutralize the
mounting opposition to Washington's militaristic
preparations.
"
The Soviet government news agency TASS responded to the U.S.
START posture by accusing the President of (1) "deceiving
public opinion" regarding the degree of U.S. flexibility, and
(2) charging that U.S. proposals were intended "to continue
the race along the channels of improving the quality of
missiles and bombers." The Soviet rejoinder stressed that
there had been no basic change in the American position, and
tediously reiterated the charge that (3) U.S. proposals were a
mask to cover American intentions of achieving nuclear
superiority over the Soviet Union.
58 Doder, "Soviets Hit U.S. Plan." This same article
contains the following interesting comment: "Soviet sources
said privately that the plan may have a 'psychological effect'
in the struggle for popular opinion. It makes it almost
impossible for Moscow to reject it outright." Note that, once
again, a Soviet criticism reveals Soviet intentions as much as
it indicts American policies. The principal audience for much
of Soviet arms control policy in this period was the West
European public.
"Excerpts From Gromyko Speech Reviewing Soviet Union's
Foreign Policy," New York Times , 17 June 1983.
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Later, the concept of 'build-down 7 was criticized
(whereby the superpowers would scrap more warheads as new ones
were deployed) : "What is meant by this is that the sides will
get the right to deploy new, upgraded systems of mass
annihilation as they phase out old, less effective ones." The
Soviet commentary also repeated the claim that Reagan's START
position was intended to protect and leave intact the
President's strategic modernization program, including the MX
missile, B-l bomber and Trident II missile.
A few weeks later, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper
Pravda commented on the new U.S. initiative, essentially
repeating the themes found in the earlier TASS commentary.
Pravda particularly stressed the notion that the new U.S.
proposals were "false and fraudulent." It also referred to
them as "gimmickry," saying:
At hand is a fresh propaganda invention designed to
mislead people by ostentatious flexibility, to conceal
the inconsistency and unacceptability of the American
stand. One should not be of such a low opinion, reaching
the point of vicious mockery, about the ability of people





The Pravda commentary also stressed other themes that by
then had become unvaryingly typical of Soviet reactions to new
U.S. initiatives in the START negotiations. Among these were:
(1) the U.S. proposals violated the principle of
"equality and equal security;"
TASS commentary reported in Dusko Doder, "Soviets:
Arms Offer 'Nothing but Words'," Washington Post , 6 Oct. 1983
61 See 23 Oct. 1983 Pravda article reported in "Reagan's
Latest Arms Proposal Just 'Gimmickry,' Pravda Says," Chicago
Tribune . 24 Oct. 1983.
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(2) the U.S. proposals sought sharp cuts in the most
important Soviet ICBMs while also seeking to protect
new American nuclear weapon programs;
(3) the United States was seeking to use START as a
means of gaining nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union; and,
(4) the latest U.S. proposals show no evidence of real
or substantive flexibility or movement from the
original U.S. position. 2
In addition to putting the U.S. in a bad light, such
criticisms may have been designed to undermine the credibility
and negotiability of U.S. proposals, promote support for the
current U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship, deflect criticisms
of the Soviet START stance, portray U.S. inflexibility as the
major obstacle to a reasonable agreement, and show the Soviet
Union to be much more committed to maintaining "peace" and
detente than the United States. Often, Soviet propaganda
efforts (including propaganda issued in arms control forums)
also sought to portray (U.S.) nuclear weapons per se as
threats to peace and stability, implying that U.S. unilateral
disarmament initiatives would prove American "good faith" and
would be a decisive move toward international peace and
security.
2. Soviet Freeze Proposals
Soviet START policies reflected a certain hierarchy of
priorities. The first priority was establishing a freeze on
new American nuclear weapons developments. Modest reductions
62 Ibid.
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in nuclear forces was a clear second priority. Accordingly, a
"freeze" in the development and deployment of strategic
offensive arms was the principle Soviet position during the
1982-1983 period — as opposed to "deep cuts," as called for
by the Reagan administration.
The Soviet proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze was
elaborated by Colonel General Nikolay Chervov during the
course of the START negotiations in the following manner:
First, it implies a ban on quantitative increases of
existing nuclear weapons (including carriers and
warheads) ; second, it implies a ban on the production of
new types of arms [
—
] weapons systems that have become
unusable or damaged can be replaced only by similar ones,
just as it is the case with replacing normal losses;
third, the plan also implies that modernizing existing
carriers and nuclear warheads should be banned as well. 63
Such a freeze on strategic weapons systems would, in
Chervov 's view, contribute to the political objective of
detente:
The implementation of the Soviet proposal on freezing
nuclear arsenals, based on the principle of equality and
equal security is likely to alleviate tension and to
normalize international relations.
Chervov incorporated the Soviet theme that a condition of
strategic parity existed, and that therefore the U.S. could
safely participate in such a freeze:
It is obvious that in view of the existing military-
strategic balance between the USSR and the United States,
V. Morozov, "Interview with Colonel General Nikolay
Chervov," Trud [Sofia, Bulgaria], 3 Aug. 1983, p. 3, in Soviet
Union: Daily Report , FBIS, 5 Aug. 1983, p. AA4
.
64 Ibid , p. AA5.
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an agreement on banning increases of nuclear weapons is
not likely to affect the security of any country
whatsoever.
A "negotiator's freeze" was part of the Soviet START
position as of Fall 1983, when the Soviets walked out of the
talks. 66
3 . Reductions Linked to INF Accord
A further aspect of Soviet policy towards "deep cuts"
during this period was the explicit precondition for
cancellation of the NATO INF modernization before the Soviet
Union would agree to progress or agreement on strategic arms
reductions. Again, a hierarchy of priorities or objectives i
evident. The Soviet Union was more interested in eliminating
the NATO INF modernization program than in reducing the level
of U.S. intercontinental-range nuclear forces. Reductions in
strategic offensive arms were subordinate to resolution of IN
systems
.
The Soviets further proposed certain conditions for
reaching a START accord. Progress in START was explicitly
linked to U.S. forthcomingness in the INF negotiations. This
meant cancelling the planned Pershing II and GLCM deployments
as a precondition to reducing strategic arms. In essence,
the Soviets were asking the United States to unilaterally
65 Ibid .
National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control:
Background and Issues , p. 67. Gorbachev would later revive
the Soviet "freeze" proposals on 22 March 1985.
67 Gelb, "Offer by Moscow."
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forego the planned INF deployments and accept stringent
restrictions on cruise missiles — all in return for both
sides assuming an equal ceiling of 1,800 ICBMs and bombers and
few limitations on corresponding Soviet INF deployments, and
no off-setting reductions in areas of Soviet advantages.
The Soviets had originally made cancelling NATO INF
modernization a precondition for beginning negotiations. Now,
after having agreed to begin negotiations without such a
commitment, the Soviets were making it a precondition for
reaching a START agreement. It should be noted that in
November 1983, when the U.S. began INF deployments, the
Soviets reverted back to their original position, and made
cancellation and withdrawal of Pershing II and GLCM
deployments a precondition for resuming arms control
negotiations.
In January 1983 Soviet officials began making threats to
"reassess" their INF negotiating position if GLCM and Pershing
II deployments proceeded as NATO planned. Ending the START
negotiations was considered a possible element of the Soviet
reassessment.
4. Soviet Definitions of "Strategic" Weapons Subject to
Reductions
Throughout this period, the Soviets insisted on defining
"strategic" weapons as those that could hit the territory of
the other side. This was a revival of an issue the Americans
thought they had resolved in SALT I, when the Soviets had made
the same argument when defining the terms of reference for the
negotiations. U.S. and Soviet negotiators in SALT I finally
68 Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Is Hopeful On Missile
Accord With the Russians," New York Times , 21 Jan. 1983.
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came to terms on this issue by defining "strategic" weapons a
those with ranges in excess of 5,000 miles. SALT II
retained this definition, although the Soviets also sought to
include U.S. 'FBS' (Forward Based Systems) in the SALT II
agreement as well. SALT II finally counted the Soviet
Backfire bomber as a theater system, not subject to the
regular SALT II limitations. U.S. cruise missiles deployed o
ships, submarines, and on the ground were similarly excluded.
In START, however, the Soviets abandonned the SALT
precedent for defining "strategic" and reintroduced their
early SALT I definition. Such a definition allows the Soviet
to count U.S. nuclear weapons deployed to Europe, or deployed
near the Soviet Union on aircraft carriers, as "strategic"
while excluding Soviet tactical and theater nuclear assets.
Of course, from the Soviet strategic planners point of
view, account must be taken for all nuclear weapons that
threaten Soviet military operations. The Soviet insistence o
defining "strategic" weapons as those that can hit the
territory of the other side, regardless of range, other
capabilities, or intended mission, suggests that this is much
more than a propaganda ploy (although it has very real and
substantial benefits in this regard) . It suggests that the
Soviet strategic outlook does indeed regard such weapons as
"strategic" in their potential effect. This point should not
f,Q ... .This Soviet view was reflected in their demands for
inclusion of limits on U.S. FBS in the ceilings on strategic
forces. See Gerard Smith, Doubletalk
.
(Garden City:
Doubleday, 1980), pp. 90-92; 182-187; and, Talbott, Endgame,
pp. 72, 148, 189.
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be lost on Western policymakers as they contemplate the
meaning of the recent INF accord in Soviet eyes. °
5. The Soviet Preference for Preserving the SALT II
Framework of Limitations
Upon arriving in Geneva for the beginning of the START
negotiations, Soviet ambassador Karpov issued a statement
reflecting the principal facets of the Soviet position on arms
control, of which START was but one. It is clear from the
statement, given below, that the Soviet Union hoped START
would be in the image of a SALT-type agreement, perhaps a SALT
III:
The USSR delegation has arrived in Geneva in order
to hold talks with the U.S. delegation on the limitation
and reduction of strategic arms and to continue that
process which is vitally important to the cause of peace
which was begun with the SALT-I and SALT-II agreements.
The USSR is striving to de everything it should in order
to rid people of the nuclear threat, to ensure a peaceful
future for all people on earth. Indeed, the pledge
adopted by the Soviet Union not to be first to use
nuclear weapons which was announced in Leonid Ilich
Brezhnev's message to the second special session of the
UN General Assembly on disarmament is of historic
significance.
If the other nuclear powers were to follow the
Soviet Union's example, then the likelihood of the
occurrence of nuclear war will be virtually reduced to
nothing.
This action by the Soviet state should be a great
and positive incentive also at the talks on the
. . 7 1limitation and reduction of strategic arms.
7 In other words, the Soviets may very well interpet the
impact of the INF accord in strategic terms.
71 •Moscow Domestic Service, "Karpov Statement on START at
Geneva Airport," in Daily Report: Soviet Union . FBIS, 28 June
1982, p. AA1.
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Those aspects of SALT II the Soviets desired to retain
were a curious assortment of limits, and included bans on the
following: developing more than one "new type" ICBM; placing
into earth orbit nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction; ocean floor basing of ballistic or cruise
missiles or launchers; basing ballistic missiles on waterborn
vehicles other than submarines; and development of
maneuverable, self-guided and penetrating warheads for
ballistic missiles.
With regard to perpetuating the SALT II framework of
limitations, the Soviets indicated a willingness to consider
modifications to the treaty, but did not state what changes
they might find acceptable. This was interpreted as an
encouraging sign of flexibility by Western journalists. 2
The achievements of SALT I and II in terms of their
importance to the Soviet Union cannot be understated. Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko noted the following in a
speech to the Supreme Soviet on 16 June 198 3 reported in the
New York Times as follows:
Previous U.S. -Soviet arms agreements had "special
importance" to the Soviet Union, and SALT II "could have
become a serious accomplishment. .
.
The current U.S. administration has "derailed the
SALT II treaty and broken off a whole set of negotiation
that were gathering momentum or were close to achieving
practical results," and "is pursuing an obstructionist
line at the Soviet-American talks on these questions tha
are going on in Geneva.
72 Ibid .
77 ...See "Excerpts From Gromyko Speech Reviewing Soviet
Union's Foreign Policy," New York Times , 17 June 1983.
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The Soviets intended START to be a follow-on agreement to
SALT II, and often referred to "SALT III" in discussions of
the arms control agenda after the SALT II agreement was
signed. Table 2 below gives specific elements of the Soviet
START proposal along with the corresponding SALT II limits to
show how early Soviet START proposals related to SALT II both
in terms of units of account and specific ceilings to be
agreed upon. 4 It should be noted that, in view of these
figures, the Soviets obviously intended START to involve only
modest reductions, if any, in offensive strategic forces.
For details on the Soviet July 1983 proposal, see:
Michael Getler, "Soviets Advance Revised Proposal On Arms
Limits," Washington Post , 13 July 1983; Hedrick Smith, "Soviet
Broadens Arms Proposals; Hope Seen By U.S.," New York Times .
14 July 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "Soviet Arms Offer Said to
Keep Rockets," Baltimore Sun , 14 July 1983; William Beecher,
"Arms Talks: A Hint of Flexibility," Boston Globe . 14 July
1983; and, William Beecher, "Soviet Hinting Thaw?" Boston
Globe , 15 July 1983.
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Table 2
SOVIET JULY 1983 START PROPOSAL AND SALT II LIMITS
Julv' 1983 Proposal SALT II
Total SNDV = 1,800 2,500/2,250
MIRVed ICBMs,
SLBMs,
and bombers = 1,200 1,320
MIRVed ICBMs
and SLBMs = 1,080 1,200
MIRVed ICBMs — 680 820
This comparison with the SALT II limitations serves at
least two other purposes here. First, it demonstrates the
explicit Soviet objective of retaining the basic SALT II
framework. Second, setting forth a START proposal so close to
the SALT II limits may have been a calculated Soviet move to
play on the differences over SALT II within the Reagan
administration, chronicled in Strobe Talbott 's book Deadly
Gambits . Talbott reports that some officials wanted the new
U.S. -Soviet strategic arms negotiations to build on the SALT
75 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan
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II agreement, while others wanted a radical departure from
SALT II 's counting rules and perceived deficiencies.
6. Renunciation of Strategic Superiority
The Soviet Union used the START negotiations to further
the deception that it had renounced strategic superiority as a
military and political objective. 77 Soviet officials made
many statements before and during START to the effect that the
USSR had not, and was not then seeking strategic superiority
over the U.S., but that the United States was determined to
achieve nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Preventing
the United States from this alleged goal was an explicit
Soviet objective. For example, in June 1983, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko stated that "the United States is bent
7 6 Early Reagan administration officials and advisors
regarded SALT II as "fatally flawed" for the following
reasons: (1) it would have permited substantial growth in both
sides' nuclear forces; (2) it limited launchers, and not
warheads or throw-weight; (3) it sanctioned the Soviets'
unilateral right to maintain 3 08 "heavy" ICBMs with no
compensating American privilege; (4) it excluded the Soviet
Backfire bomber; (5) the Protocol set an undesirable precedent
for limiting U.S. INF systems (cruise missiles) without
restrictions on comparable Soviet systems; (6) it lacked
sufficiently rigorous verification procedures; and, (7) it
promoted, rather than ameliorated, adverse trends in the U.S.-
Soviet strategic balance.
See William C. Green, Soviet Disinformation and
Strategic Deception Concerning Its Nuclear Weapons Policy ,
Report submitted to the Department of National Security
Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Feb.
1984.
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on achieving strategic nuclear superiority, and the Soviet
70
Union is equally determined to prevent it. °
During the recess between Rounds One and Two Soviet
spokesmen went to work making the case for their START
position to the Western media. Maj . Gen. Viktor Starodubov,
the General Staff representative on the Soviet START
delegation, gave a three hour "interview" to members of the
Western press in which he stressed the several principal
• • 79themes the Soviets had been pursuing in Geneva. Starodubov
made Soviet strategic objectives in START very explicit. They
were:
(1) to place limits on U.S. cruise missile developments;
(2) to ensure that British and French independent
nuclear forces were counted against the U.S.
strategic total
;
(3) to impose limits on other U.S. strategic
developments of concern to the Soviet Union, namely
the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine;
and,
(4) to stress the Soviet Union's commitment to "equality
and equal security" as the basis of agreement.
None of these objectives explicitly included deep
reductions in strategic offensive forces.
Starodubov, according to this report said that basic
Soviet policy was "peace and a stable balance," and repeatedly
7R ....
"Excerpts From Gromyko Speech Reviewing Soviet Union's
Foreign Policy," New York Times , 17 June 1983.
79 Flora Lewis, "Soviet Arms-Control Expert Asks Nuclear
Balance," New York Times , 2 Sept. 1982.
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insisted that "the Soviet Union sought only a balance in
strategic weapons." Starodubov further stated:
Security is our highest interest. We think it is
dangerous if the United States is superior in some types
of arms. The Americans could exploit superiority for
political purposes, and from that, it would not be a long
way to conflict.
We have always been following the United States on
the arms issue. History shows that the Soviet Union has
never been superior to the United States in strategic
arms. 80
7 . Reductions in Land- Versus Sea-Based Forces
President Reagan had early on made reductions in land-
based ICBMs the focus of his START priorities, arguing that
these weapons, ideally suited to surprise disarming attacks,
were the most destabilizing:
The main threat to pace posed by nuclear weapons
today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance.
This is due to the increasingly destructive potential of
the massive Soviet buildup in its ballistic missile
force.
Therefore, our goal is to enhance deterrence and
achieve stability through significant reductions in the
most destabilizing nuclear systems — ballistic missiles,
and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles —
while maintaining a nuclear capability sufficient to
deter conflict, underwrite our national security and meet
our commitment to allies and friends.
80 Ibid .
81 ii^ext of President Reagan's Address on Nuclear Policy
and East-West Ties," New York Times , 10 May 1982.
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Accordingly, U.S. START proposals called for specific anc
significant reductions in land-based ICBMs, where the Soviets
enjoyed a 1,498 to 1,054 (42 percent) advantage in 1982. For
example, the U.S. proposed a limit of 1,250 on land- and sea-
based missiles, of which no more than 850 could be land-
based. This reflected American efforts to reduce the Soviet
land-based ICBM threat to the survivability of U.S. nuclear
deterrent forces.
The U.S. was particularly interested in effecting
reductions in Soviet "heavy" ICBMs, with MIRVed warheads
several times larger than those in the U.S. inventory, and
which posed a substantial first-strike threat to U.S. hardened
military assets such as command bunkers and missile silos.
The U.S. had long urged the Soviet Union to place more oi
its nuclear warhead arsenal on submarines. This was because
U.S. strategic logic (although not Soviet strategic logic)
dictated that survivability of a retaliatory force was the
sine quo non of stability in the nuclear missile age. J U.S.
negotiators had made such arguments in SALT and put them forth
again in START. 84 And, as they had in SALT, the Soviets also
rejected this logic with equal fervor in START.
In an interview published in a West German periodical,
Andropov criticized this basis of the U.S. approach to START
in the following terms:
82 Charles W. Corddry, "U.S. Offers Soviets Draft of Arms
Treaty," Baltimore Sun . 8 July 1983.
81 ... . .Soviet strategic logic dictates that the ability to
preempt an enemy's preparations for an attack is the essence
of stability because it will discourage the enemy from
undertaking the attempt.
84 Talbott, Deadly Gambits , p. 250.
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. . . the United States is a sea power. We are a land
power and most of our nuclear weapons were deployed on
land. Now the Americans suggest reductions in land-based
nuclear weapons, leaving sea-based missiles aside. We,
naturally, take exception to this approach. We for our
part take account of all the types of nuclear weapons
available to both sides and suggest even reductions in
them on both sides, reductions to the point of their
eventual complete elimination.
The Soviet Union had not intentions of restructuring its
strategic forces along lines that would emulate the American
strategic triad. Its force posture was driven by its own
rationale.
85 Rudolf Augstein in Per Spiegel , cited by TASS, 24
April 1983 in USSR UN press release dated 26 April 1983,
reprinted in The Arms Control Reporter , May 1983, pp.
611. B. 92-93.
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C. Soviet Policy Towards Throw-weight Limits
As noted earlier, an important U.S. objective in START
was to redress areas of significant imbalance between U.S. anc
Soviet strategic nuclear forces. One such area was missile
throw-weight — the total payload capacity of a missile,
considered a verifiable and accurate measurement of a
missile's destructive potential as well as its capacity for
carrying MIRVed warheads.
Of particular concern to U.S. officials was the vast
throw-weight capacity of Soviet large ICBMs. At some point
during Round Two of START the United States proposed reducing
by two-thirds the numbers of SS-18 and SS-19 launchers as an
indirect effort to limit Soviet throw-weight. 86
On 8 June 1983 when START resumed, the United States
government put forth new proposals incorporating many of the
Scowcroft Commission recommendations and bowing to heavy
07 ...pressure from Congress. These modifications to the early
U.S. START position were tabled in draft treaty form in July
1983. These changes included agreeing to flexibility on ways
to redress the U.S. -Soviet throw-weight disparity.
On 7 July 1983 the United States submitted a draft treaty
at the START negotiations designed to meet certain principal
Soviet objections to earlier American stances. Among others,
86 Strobe Talbott in The Arms Control Reporter , Feb.
1983, p. 611. B. 71; and, Strobe Talbott, "A Tougher Stand for
START," Time , 7 Feb. 1983, p. 28.
87 Lou Cannon, "Reagan Reveals New Plan on Arms Cut
Talks," Washington Post , 9 June 1983; Karen Elliott House,
"Reagan's Revisions of Arms-Control Plan Stress Flexibility,
Seek a Soviet Response," Wall Street Journal , 9 June 1983; see
also, "New U.S. Stance On Arms Control," cited earlier.
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R8it proposed an unspecified ceiling on throw-weight.
However, throughout this first phase of the START
negotiations, the Soviets adamantly refused direct limitations
or reductions on missile throw-weight, as they were to do in
the 1984-1987 period as well.
Soviet arguments against throw-weight as a unit of
limitation stressed several themes. First, this was an issue
fabricated by the Americans for the purpose of labeling
certain Soviet weapons "destabilizing." The Soviets did not
accept the argument that their heavy ICBMs were destabilizing.
Second, the Soviets insisted that throw-weight was not
necessarily the most important measure of a missile's
destructive potential. Accuracy and yield were more critical
to a missile's effectiveness, they noted. Third, Soviet
officials denounced U.S. calls for throw-weight reductions to
equal levels as inconsistent with the principle of "equality
and equal security," meaning it would require the Soviets to
give up more than the U.S.
88 Charles W. Corddry, "U.S. Offers Soviets Draft of Arms
Treaty," Baltimore Sun . 8 July 1983.
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D. Soviet Policy Towards Reductions in "Heavy" ICBMs
Another dimension of the U.S. concern with the
destabilizing features of the Soviet strategic nuclear posture
was the question of "heavy" ICBMs. The definition of a
"heavy" ICBM had evolved throughout the SALT I and II
negotiations to eventually refer to the largest of Soviet and
American missiles. For the Soviets, this included 308 SS-18s.
For this U.S., this meant 54 Titan ICBMs. U.S. START
proposals called for a reduction to 110 in Soviet "heavy"
ICBMs. 89
The Soviet Union, however, adamantly rejected proposals
for reductions in its land-based "heavy" ICBM force.
Furthermore, at one point the Soviets tied U.S. efforts to
reduce "heavy" missiles to proposals for limits on U.S. cruise
missiles, arguing that the sides might trade-off asymmetric
areas of relative advantages. Again, the Soviets invoked the
principle of "equality and equal security" saying an agreement
to reductions in "heavy" ICBMs would be one-sided. This was,
in effect, a claim to a unilateral right to deploy weapons of
significantly greater potential than the other side had.
The Soviets also denounced U.S. efforts to secure
reductions in "heavy" ICBMs in START as unwarranted attempts
to interfere in what they considered a domestic matter — the
structuring of their strategic nuclear force posture.
Later in START (i.e. by the end of 1987), the Soviets
accepted such reductions, apparently convinced that fixed
land-based ICBMs were increasingly vulnerable to new
generations of U.S. weapons and should be replaced by mobile
89 Charles W. Corddry, "U.S. Offers Soviets Draft of Arms
Treaty," Baltimore Sun , 8 July 1983.
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rail- or road-based missiles. Soviet acquiescence on this
point was also probably linked to undisclosed American
concessions.
E. Soviet Policy Towards Warheads as a Unit of Limitation
The U.S. consistently pressed for an overall ceiling on
strategic nuclear warheads, as well as various warhead
sublimits in START. The Soviets denounced these efforts as
"selective," and "unequal."
The Soviets never proposed direct limits on warheads in
this period of the START negotiations, other than to propose
unspecified "equal limits" for both sides — their position as
of the end of Round Five in the fall of 1983 prior to walking
out. 90
The Soviets did, however, propose at this point that SALT
II-type fractionation limits on MIRV systems be included in
START (Soviet proposal as of Fall 1983). 91
While the U.S. side placed emphasis on limiting the
numbers of warheads, the Soviets continued to stress missile
numbers as the basic unit of account in START.
On 28 May 1982, Pravda published a statement saying the
U.S. intends "to retain virtually intact the mainstays of its
nuclear arsenal" while compelling the Soviets to "reduce the
most modern type of armaments." In an obvious response to
National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control:
Background and Issues , p. 67.
91 Ibid .
92 William Beecher, "US to Alter Arms-Limit Proposal,"
Boston Globe . 20 May 1983.
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trends in United States thinking on START, it further
reiterated that the Soviet Union sought reductions in both
warheads and missiles, but the warhead limits would be more or
less indirect.
On 17 July 1983 Pravda published an editorial
criticizing the U.S. for "attempts at legalizing its
unprecedented arms race under the cover of the talks" and
denied that the U.S. position in the talks had undergone any
change. It sought to distinguish the Soviet approach to START
from the U.S. approach by saying that Washington had adopted
"selective" reduction policy, singling out certain groups of
strategic weapons for reduction while leaving others
unlimited:
The USSR stands for a comprehensive approach — all
strategic delivery vehicles would be subject to
restrictions and reductions in their aggregate, not in
some artificially singled out groups or portions.
Likewise, all nuclear warheads would be taken into
account within the framework of the agreed-upon ceiling.
The Soviet Union concretely proposes that the total
aggregate level of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery
vehicles of the sides should be below the number of
nuclear warheads which the United States now has.
Exactly this approach is the basis of the draft treaty
which was submitted by the Soviet delegation in Geneva.
Soon after the United States submitted its draft START
treaty, the Soviet Union offered a "new" set of proposals,
probably intended to offset the impression of greater American
flexibility. It retained the 1,800 overall ceiling on
"strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" (SNDV) while dividing
93 Pravda , 28 May 1983.
94 Pravda, 17 July 1983, p. 5
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this into three categories for long-range, cruise missile-
equipped bombers, submarine- and land-based ballistic
missiles, and land-based MIRVed missiles. The limits were to
be achieved in phases by 1990. But here again, there were to
be no direct limits on warheads.
The Soviet proposal (of July 1983) continued to make no
mention of warhead limits , although the U.S. side had been
emphasizing placing limits on the numbers of warheads for some
time, rather than simply limits on the number of launchers —
a major U.S. criticism of SALT I and II. 95
F. Observations on the 1982-1983 Time Frame
The following observations are derived from the foregoing
analysis:
First, the Soviet Union resisted U.S. attempts to
restructure its strategic nuclear force posture in START and
INF. The Soviets did this by refusing to consider "deep cuts"
in land-based strategic missile forces and ceilings on certain
categories of warheads.
Second, the Soviet Union sought to protect the essential
features of its strategic modernization program, while halting
that of the United States. It did this by proposing a ban on
For details on the Soviet July 1983 proposal, see:
Michael Getler, "Soviets Advance Revised Proposal On Arms
Limits," Washington Post , 13 July 1983; Hedrick Smith, "Soviet
Broadens Arms Proposals; Hope Seen By U.S.," New York Times .
14 July 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "Soviet Arms Offer Said to
Keep Rockets," Baltimore Sun , 14 July 1983; William Beecher,
"Arms Talks: A Hint of Flexibility," Boston Globe , 14 July
1983; and, William Beecher, "Soviet Hinting Thaw?" Boston
Globe , 15 July 1983.
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strategic modernization, but applied it to systems not yet
tested as of the date of negotiations.
Third, the Soviets resisted using warheads as a major
direct unit of limitation, and demonstrated a definite
preference for "launchers" or "missiles" as the principal
units of limitation in their START proposals. While warheads
would have been indirectly restricted by ceilings on the
numbers of launchers or missiles, as well as on the
fractionation of MIRVed missiles, such limits (as proposed in
the Soviet START position, i.e. no more than 10 warheads per
MIRVed launcher) would have allowed a significant expansion in
the numbers of warheads available to the Soviet Union for
targeting against the United States. This would have been the
case since many systems the Soviets were proposing for the 10
warhead limit did not then carry a total of 10 warheads (i.e.
certain ICBMs)
.
Fourth, the Soviets also resisted the U.S. attempt to
focus limitations on land-based systems, claiming in several
public statements that they wished to focus on the entire
strategic situation, rather than single out specific systems
for reductions. To be sure, the Soviets adopted this position
as a countermove to U.S. proposals for reductions in Soviet
"heavy" ICBMs, considered by the U.S. to be the most
destabilizing because of their potential to disarm the U.S.
ICBM force in a surprise attack. But there is another
dimension to this Soviet position. It reveals ostensible
Soviet attitudes towards what constitutes "destabilizing"
weapons. In the START negotiations, the Soviets often defined
U.S. cruise missiles and SLBMs as destabilizing because of
their potential for short-warning attacks.
This distinction between the U.S. definition of
destabilizing weapons (i.e. weapons that are easily preempted
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by a first strike) versus the Soviet definition (that which
can strike with little warning time) may show that the Soviets
are relatively unconcerned with riding out a first strike
surprise attack, or that they intend to respond to warning of
an imminent attack by "launching on warning" — something the
Soviets have denied as their official policy, but which they
have posture themselves to do, have developed the strategic
doctrine for, and appear to be protecting in their START
proposals.
Much of the Soviet START position at the end of 1983
closely paralleled that of specific SALT I and II provisions,
and appeared designed to place severe restrictions on the
Reagan administration's advertised U.S. strategic
modernization program.
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IV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS STRATEGIC
ARMS REDUCTIONS, 1984-1987
A. Introductory Remarks
This period differs from the 1982-1983 phase of START
principally in that Soviet policy toward reductions in
offensive strategic arms was subordinated to calls for
restrictions on future U.S. strategic defense options (the
Soviets denied any intention on their own part to deploy
strategic defenses) rather than to demands that the U.S.
cancel its NATO INF modernization plans. Soviet START policy
also underwent substantial changes in terms of numbers of
weapons Moscow was willing to cut. However, Soviet START
policy continued to reflect a clear rejection of U.S. concepts
of stability and deterrence, boding ill for long-term
prospects of Soviet compliance with a START agreement.
There are a number of notable dimensions to Soviet START
policy in this period. The Soviet Union became much more
interested in deep reductions of offensive force levels after
the President's Strategic Defense Initiative became
institutionalized in the U.S. through initially strong
congressional funding support. Soviet strategic arms
proposals -in this period are much more characteristic of
historical Soviet objectives for a "nuclear free world," in
that they are reminiscent of Soviet proposals for "General and
Complete Disarmament" (GCD) from the 1950s and 1960s.
Also, in the aftermath of the collapsed INF and START
negotiations, the Soviet Union immediately initiated several
arms control efforts, or reemphasized previous arms control
forums. These proposals were probably intended in part to
serve as distractions from the fact that the Soviets had
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suspended bilateral U.S. -Soviet discussions on strategic
nuclear weapons during 1984, and to offset criticism of the
USSR for having derailed the nuclear arms control process.
They included the following initiatives:
1) In January 1984, the Soviets made certain proposals
regarding chemical weapons;
2) In the summer of 1984 the Soviets initiated new
proposals on space arms and ASAT weapons;
3) The Soviets reintroduced a "no first-use" of nuclear
weapons proposal in January 1985;
4) On 7 April 1985 the Soviets offered a moratorium on
INF deployments (again reviving an earlier
position)
;
5) On 17 April 1985 the Soviets announced a unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing.
In the midst of these proposals, the Soviets continued
• 9R •deploying new weapons. Such developments in the 1985 to
1987 period included: the first operational cruise of the
Delta IV SSBN equipped with the new SS-N-2 3 SLBM; the
deployment of the USSR's fifth generation road-mobile ICBM
(the SS-25) ; test flights of the SS-18 Mod 4 follow-on ICBM,
as well as test flights of a new version of the SS-20 missile;
96 Los Angeles Times , 30 Jan. 1985.
97 Los Angeles Times , 18 April 1985.
98 For example, see New York Times , 9 June 1985; and,
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power , various
issues.
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the equipping of 50 operational Bear H bombers fitted with
3,000 kilometer-range, nuclear capable AS-15 ALCMs; the
deployment of a new generation of mobile surface-to-air
missiles with potential ballistic missile intercept
capabilities; the launchings of a new Kirov-class cruiser, a
new Sierra-class nuclear powered attack submarine, and a fift
Typhoon-class SSBN.
B. Soviet Policy Towards "Deep Cuts"
Four fundamental dimensions of Soviet policy toward
strategic arms reductions in general concern us at this point
First, as they had done with U.S. INF modernization, the
Soviets now made American concessions regarding strategic
defense programs a virtual precondition for negotiations or
agreements on reducing long-range offensive weapons. Second,
the Soviets re-introduced their earlier proposals for a freeze
or and moratorium on the development and deployment of new
strategic weapons. Third, the Soviet attitude toward
strategic arms reductions in general was characterized by a
high degree of propaganda. Fourth, as in the earlier period,
Soviet criticisms of the U.S. approach to arms reductions is
also generally indicative of Soviet priorities and objectives.
These four issues are examined below.
1. Linkage to SDI
Beginning in mid-1984, the Soviets focused their
diplomatic initiatives on a broad range of fronts against the
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. An arms control solution
to evolving strategic defense programs replaced eliminating
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NATO INF deployments as the chief Soviet priority in arms
control talks, and as the major precondition to "deep cuts" in
long-range offensive nuclear weapons.
2 . Renewal of Soviet Freeze Proposals
Earlier Soviet freeze proposals were explicitly aimed at
blocking President Reagan's strategic modernization program,
that had called for substantial upgrading of all three legs of
the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. The specific targets of
these freeze proposals included the MX ICBM, the Trident D-5
SLBM, and the various U.S. cruise missile programs. The
revived freeze proposals in 1985 appeared aimed at a different
target altogether. As the following passage shows, the new
target for Soviet freeze proposals was the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative:
The point of departure that would enable us to lay the
foundations for subsequent reductions in arms stockpiles
would be a freeze imposed for the whole duration of the
Geneva talks on the sides 7 nuclear arsenals and an end to
the preparations for the development of weapons to be
deployed in space.
99 See, for example, B. Dubrovin, "Geneva: At the START
of the Round," Pravda , 5 June 1985, p. 5.
100 Lev Semeyko, "Detente: Who Votes 'No'," Sovetskaya
Rossiva , 29 May 1985, p. 5.
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3 . Soviet Proposals for Weapons Reductions
During this period, there was an early emphasis in Soviet
declaratory policy on modest cuts in strategic weapons, on the
order of 25 percent. The Soviets later proposed 50 percent
and even 100 percent reductions, before returning to a more
conservative stance in their START negotiating posture.
The 2 5 percent reductions the Soviets proposed in the
first and second rounds of START in 1985 was basically a
revival of their 1982-1983 position. The primary unit of
account would have been strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(SNDVs) , and the proposed cuts would have resulted in equal
ceilings of about 1800 launchers. Throughout this period the
focus was on reducing "strategic means" — a Soviet phrase
referring to the launch vehicles rather than the warheads. 101
When, later in the talks, the Soviets introduced radical
proposals for reductions in strategic arms, they were, in
effect, reviving Soviet General and Complete Disarmament
proposals from the 1950s and early 1960s.
The public nature of these proposals, accompanied by
considerable fanfare, suggests they had primarily a propaganda
intent.
4 . Soviet Criticisms of U.S. Proposals for "Deep Cuts"
There were three basic themes to Soviet criticisms of the
U.S. approach to START in the 1984-1987 period, and all three
were repititions from the earlier timeframe. First, Soviet
commentators claimed that the U.S. sought to apply cuts
See, for example, "What Is Hampering Progress at the
Geneva Talks," Pravda , 1 Aug. 1985, pp. 4-5.
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disproportionately, and selectively, only to ballistic missile
warheads. w " In Soviet propaganda literature, its own
approach was often contrasted with this American policy by
saying the USSR sought broader cuts, and did not single out
certain categories of weapons systems. Second, the Soviets
continued to claim that the U.S. approach to START was aimed
at forcing a fundamental restructuring of the Soviet strategic
nuclear posture, by calling for specific sublimits on
ballistic missiles, and especially land-based ICBMs.
Third, Soviet authors frequently claimed that the
selective nature of the cuts proposed by Washington would
allow the U.S. to add 8,000 cruise missiles (on 400 bombers),
and even to reach a total of 15,000 warheads (despite a
proposed START limit of 5,000 to 6,000) by adding Short-Range
Attack Missiles (SRAMs) and gravity bombs to U.S. strategic
i mbombers, which Soviet sources counted at 600. These
figures greatly exaggerated the number of operational U.S.
bombers, and probably counted non-strategic bombers such as
the FB-111 as well.
102
Tll j_s waS/ in fact, a valid observation. The U.S.
considered ballistic missile warheads, particularly on heavy
Soviet ICBMs, to be the most destabilizing.
103 Examples of this kind of Soviet commentary can be
found in Vladimir Chernyshev, Tass dispatch of 10 June 1985,
given in FBIS, Daily Report; Soviet Union . 11 June 1985, pp.
AA2-AA3; and, "What Is Hampering Progress at the Geneva
Talks," Prayda, 1 Aug. 1985, pp. 4-5.
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C. Soviet Policy Towards Throw-weight Limits
During this period the Soviets continued to resist U.S.
attempts to introduce direct throw-weight limitations into the
terms of a draft START agreement.
In an interview at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet
Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev made the following
comment relating to Soviet views of "stabilizing" versus
"destabilizing" weapons, and throw-weight as a unit of
limitation in the arms talks:
The notion of the "particularly destabilizing"
qualities of the Soviet ICBM's is a discovery which saw
the light only in 1980. The present U.S. Administration
qualifies the means that are most developed in the
U.S.S.R. and constitute the backbone of its defenses, in
particular the ICBM's, as "destabilizing" and subject to
scrapping, while calling those means the U.S. is stronger
in, namely ballistic missiles on submarines, heavy
bombers with 20-28 long-range cruise missiles each, as
stability and security factors.
We cannot agree to such an understanding. One
should not assess the power of missiles solely by their
ability to destroy fully hardened installations while
laying particular emphasis on their throw weight. The
throw weight is not the only and not the principal
criterion for the warhead yield.
A more important criterion is the accuracy of a
warhead. A twofold increase in accuracy leads to an
eightfold growth in warhead yield. It means the the .
throw weight cannot be considered as the basis for
estimating the country's strategic defense potential.
The U.S. proposal on that score is aimed at undermining
unilaterally the strategic nuclear forces of the
U.S.S.R. 104
104 Leslie Gelb in New York Times , 13 Oct. 1985, and 18
Oct. 1985.
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D. Soviet Policy Towards Warheads as a Unit of Limitation
The Soviets had proposed severe restrictions on Trident
submarine and missile deployment in the first rounds of START
in 1982 and 1983, but dropped these proposals by July 1983.
However, the July 1983 Soviet proposal also dropped the
earlier Soviet proposal for banning or strictly limiting
additional missile submarines of the U.S. Ohio (Trident) class
and equivalent Soviet submarines, and the proposed total ban
on deploying Trident II missiles then being developed by the
United States. 105
Also, the Soviet Union had dropped (as of the fall of
1983) earlier proposals for banning Trident II, long-range
air-launched cruise missiles, limiting the U.S. deployment of
Trident submarines from four to six, and a call to reduce the
number of missile tubes on future Trident submarines from 24
to 16. As noted, these positions did not differ
appreciably from the July 1983 Soviet START proposals.
Soviet efforts in the period 1984-1987 regarding
limitations on warheads seem to have focused on reducing U.S.
SLBM weapons. These weapons currently have limited
counterforce capability due to their combination of low
accuracy and small yield, but the Soviets must take two facts
105 For details on the Soviet July 1983 proposal, see:
Michael Getler, "Soviets Advance Revised Proposal On Arms
Limits," Washington Post , 13 July 1983; Hedrick Smith, "Soviet
Broadens Arms Proposals; Hope Seen By U.S.," New York Times .
14 July 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "Soviet Arms Offer Said to
Keep Rockets," Baltimore Sun . 14 July 1983; William Beecher,
"Arms Talks: A Hint of Flexibility," Boston Globe . 14 July
1983; and, William Beecher, "Soviet Hinting Thaw?" Boston
Globe . 15 July 1983.
106 Ibid.
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into consideration. First, U.S. submarine-based nuclear
warheads make up a majority of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
certainly a vast majority of the survivable warheads. The
Soviets must take seriously the threat of retaliation by
several thousand SLBM warheads. Second, the United States
will soon deploy the new Trident D-5 with improved range,
accuracy, and yield, resulting in the first significant
counterforce capability at sea.
A principal Soviet objective at START in view of these
two considerations has been to reduce the number of U.S. sea-
based warheads down to a level more manageable by its ABM
system. Fewer warheads delivered from fewer platforms could
potentially simplify the defensive task of the Moscow ABM
system. Fewer warheads would ease the burden on the Soviet
ABM interceptors, while fewer launch platforms would decrease
the number of directions from which U.S. missiles would be
approaching, greater simplifying the target acquisition and
tracking requirements for Soviet ABM radar.
There is also the possibility that Soviet objectives in
focusing on the reduction of SLBM warheads include increasing
the effectiveness of Soviet air defense surface-to-air missil
systems. These missiles reportedly have acquired dual
capability against both air-breathing and ballistic threats.
If this is so, they may have limited capabilities against
incoming SLBM warheads, and could make a potential
contribution to the Moscow area ABM system by thinning out
inbound warheads prior to their interception by Moscow-based
ABM missiles. Reducing the SLBM warhead threat through arms
control agreements would certainly augment the value of such
dual-capable air defense missiles.
An overture made by the Soviets prior to the Geneva
summit in November 1985 was touted as a "quick cut" in ICBMs,
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calling for the superpowers to reduce land-based
intercontinental missiles by 200-300 as a demonstration of
good faith. However, the Soviet proposal referred to
launchers and not warheads, and could have been carried out by
the Soviet Union through the retirement of their oldest and
least effective ICBMs due to have been retired four years
earlier, while the U.S. would have had to make its cuts from
its active Minuteman ICBM force. 107
In October 1987, Soviet leader Gorbachev again signalled
the Soviet emphasis on reducing U.S. SLBM warheads. He
offered to accept the U.S. -proposed sublimit of 3,3 00 land-
based warheads if the United States agreed to reduce its
submarine-launched ballistic missiles from 5,640 to 2,000
1 OR
warheads. Acceptance of this proposal would place severe
constraints the U.S. Trident program, if not doom it
altogether. Of course, this has been a major Soviet objective
since the beginning of START in June 1982. A further Soviet
condition for accepting the U.S . -proposed sublimits on
ballistic missile warheads appeared to be American acceptance
of an agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a ten
1 09year period.
107 Don Oberdorfer and David Hoffman, "Quick Cut in ICBMs
Proposed by Soviets," Washington Post , 14 Nov. 1985.
108 R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. May Drop Warhead Limit
Demand," Washington Post , 4 Dec. 1987.
109 The Arms Control Reporter , 22-23 October, p.
611. B. 418-419.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In START the United States was trying to alter the
existing U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship — the Soviet
Union was attempting to preserve it. American officials were
discontented with the nuclear strategic balance as it had
evolved by the beginning of the 1980s because of the perceived
vulnerability of the U.S. deterrent force to Soviet preemption
in a surprise attack or escalated crisis. In particular, U.S.
officials and analysts were concerned about the accumulated
Soviet superiority in hard-target warheads on land-based
ICBMs. These were weapons ideally suited for only one
mission: preemptively destroying the other side's nuclear
retaliatory capability before it could be launched. In START,
the U.S. sought to rectify this destabilizing situation by
seeking substantial reductions in Soviet "heavy" ICBMs, direct
limits on warheads, and throw-weight limitations.
On the other hand, Soviet satisfaction with the existing
strategic relationship was evidenced in Moscow's emphasis on
securing a freeze on new deployments of strategic weapons, and
in seeking to preserve the SALT II framework of limitations on
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle ceilings and modernization
restrictions. Apart from these priorities, other Soviet
negotiating objectives included heading off emerging U.S.
nuclear weapon systems with the potential for upsetting the
USSR's advantages in nuclear strength and restoring the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory force, such as
long-range air-launched cruise missiles and new Trident
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Soviet START priorities can help predict Soviet
propensities for compliance or noncompliance with a START
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accord in the future. Specifically, Soviet policy toward
strategic arms reductions has been manifested on two levels.
On the one level, the Soviet Union has made much propaganda
about its commitment to disarmament, particularly strategic
nuclear weapon disarmament. Thus, it has certain strong
incentives to publicly propose and insist upon reductions in
offensive nuclear forces. These public declarations would
indicate an ostensibly high Soviet priority on reducing
strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles for the sake of minimizing
the chances for a devastating nuclear war of global
dimensions.
On the second level, the Soviet negotiating stance on
nuclear force reductions during the period 1982 to 1987 has
been subject to dramatic changes and occasional reverses of
policy. This clearly demonstrates that Soviet policy on
strategic nuclear force reductions has been subordinate to
other factors, notably NATO INF deployments (during the 1982
to 1983 period) and U.S. SDI intentions (during the 1984 to
1987 period)
.
Why has Soviet policy toward strategic arms reductions
been subordinate to other considerations? There are several
reasons why the Soviets may have considered other issues of
greater importance than reducing strategic nuclear weapons,
despite the importance attached to this issue by official
Soviet propaganda.
First, the Soviets had a substantial superiority in this
category of the U.S. -Soviet nuclear balance, thus the U.S.
lacked the bargaining leverage to sustain Soviet interests in
deep cuts in these types of weapons.
Second, from the viewpoint of Soviet military deterrence
and targeting requirements, strategic nuclear forces play the
most crucial role, the Soviets may not be prepared to
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downgrade the function of long-range nuclear weapons to the
extent called for in arms control proposals;
Third, other categories of U.S. weapons or weapons
programs posed greater threats to specific Soviet military
objectives — NATO's INF modernization efforts threatened to
militate the effects of Soviet nuclear hegemony on the Central
Front in Europe, and the U.S. SDI program threatens Soviet
advantages in space and strategic defense programs.
What do these likely Soviet calculations tell us about
the prospects of Soviet compliance with strategic arms
reductions? Should the Soviet Union decide to sign a
strategic arms reduction agreement along the lines now being
considered in Geneva, it will probably be the result of one or
more of the following considerations:
1. Such an agreement was conditional upon resolution of
other, more important issues — such as INF and SDI.
For example, such an agreement was required to
persuade the U.S. to abandon its SDI efforts;
2
.
Such an agreement did not unduly restrict Soviet
offensive nuclear force modernization;
3. Such an agreement promoted Soviet foreign policy
objectives with respect to detente. That is, it
fostered greater cooperation on trade and credits
with the West; (It should be assumed that this
would be an inevitable bi-product of any Soviet arms
control commitment.)
4. Such an agreement did not provide verification,
procedures that intruded unwarrantedly on the
operational security of the Soviet military, or on
Soviet nuclear force procurement processes;
5. Such an agreement was worded in a manner allowing
for a wide lattitude of interpretation.
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Owing to the fact that Soviet START negotiating policy
has been subordinated to other considerations, it is
reasonable to assume that Soviet compliance with any START
agreement may also be subordinated to extraneous
considerations. What factors may influence or condition
Soviet compliance (or non-compliance) with a START agreement?
Any significant change in the strategic situation at the
time of the signing of an agreement (including any projected
change with potentially significant impact on the strategic
balance) is likely to be taken by the Soviets as an excuse for
selective non-compliance with a START agreement. The Soviets
are not likely to delay a response to such changes until after
seeking redress of their concerns through diplomatic channels,
as would the United States. This does not mean that they will
forego making an issue of such changes in diplomatic forums,
merely that they will demonstrate their willingness to respond
to such changes whether or not they are reversed or redressed
by Western powers in diplomatic channels.
Soviet activities relating to a START agreement will
almost certainly fall into one or more of three different
categories of possible interpretation:
(1) they will clearly comply with an agreement;
(2) they will violate the letter of an agreement;
(3) they will violate the spirit of an agreement.
It is probable that many Soviet actions with respect to a
future START agreement will be interpreted by the U.S. as
violating the spirit of an agreement because the Soviets have
entirely different conceptions of strategic concepts such as
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"stability" and "deterrence," as discussed elsewhere in this
report.
Furthermore, many Soviet actions are likely to represent
violations of the letter of an agreement from the U.S.
perspective because the Soviet military will fail to interpret
the obligations undertaken by the Soviet leadership is a
fashion that corresponds to the American interpretation.
U.S. success in START must ultimately be evaluated in
terms of Soviet compliance with a future START agreement. The
signing of an agreement in and of itself cannot be viewed as
the principal measure of arms control success. How well the
respective parties to the agreement comply with its terms, anc
how effectively this compliance contributes to deterrence and
stability should be regarded as the minimum acceptable
standard of success in START as well as in other areas of arms
control
.
To have a truly effective and enduring arms control
regime, it is essential that the parties to an agreement share
common views of what constitutes deterrence and stability.
They must agree on what types of weapons, policies, and
postures are "destabilizing" and which are "stabilizing."
Otherwise there is likely to be disagreement on interpreting
the terms of agreements, since a written document cannot
always specify in detail every contingency that may arise in
process of implementing an agrement.
This requirement for mutual agreement on common interests
in deterrence and stability has been recognized by U.S.
analysts and decisionmakers since the early days of Soviet-
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American arms negotiations. 110 The START record, as examined
below, shows a continuing discordance of U.S. and Soviet views
and prescriptions relating to the establishment of a durable
strategic stability. This means that the U.S. and Soviet
Union will probably enter a strategic arms reduction agreement
with incompatible policies for maintaining nuclear deterrence.
Compliance problems are bound to arise unless the U.S.
recognizes this difficulty and is prepared to deal with it
effectively.
110 See, for example, Hedley Bull, The Control of the
Arms Race , (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 9-10; Robert
McNamara recognized the requirement for a common view of
stability with regard to the ABM Treaty, see Michael Charlton,
From Deterrence to Defence: The Inside Story of Strategic
Policy
.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)
, pp. 4-5.
Gerard Smith, chief U.S. negotiator for SALT I also
acknowledged this: "If there was to be success at SALT, I felt
that the two sides would to some extent have to pursue a
similar strategic doctrine...." See Gerard Smith, Doubletalk:
The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ,
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1980), p. 24. This theme is further
explored by the present author in a paper titled "US-Soviet
Relations and Arms Control: Prospects for the Late 1980s,"
prepared for delivery at the 1985 New Faces Conference on the
Future of Nuclear Arms Control , held at the Villa Serbelloni
Rockefeller Conference Center, Bollagio, Italy, July 1985.
jointly sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies and the Arms Control Association.
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